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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the constitutionality of President 
Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War and poses the question 
of whether Lincoln taking possession of the railroads and 
telegraph companies during the Civil War was constitutional. 
The answer to this was, Lincoln’s actions were, in fact, 
constitutional because Congress expressly authorized his 
actions. His taking possession of the railroads and telegraph 
companies provided compensation to the companies affected. 
Further,  the article analyzes the constitutional and 
congressional authority for allowing President Lincoln to take 
possession and provide compensation. The article also 
addresses the history of the Presidential “Commander-in-
Chief” powers, prior to and contemporaneous to the Civil War. 
 The article also addresses the contemporaneous and 
post effects of his using the executive action and its 
technological, infrastructural, and practical effects upon the 
Civil War. Finally, the article addresses the lasting effects from 
President Lincoln’s expansion of the scope of executive power, 
including both future presidents and case law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil War was America’s greatest constitutional 
crisis, but slavery was not the only constitutional issue to arise 
during the war. During the Civil War, many legal issues arose 
including alleged violations of habeas corpus, First Amendment 
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rights violations, and slavery’s eventual prohibition. One of the 
lesser-known constitutional issues implicated in the Civil War 
was the government’s taking of private property from Union 
citizens.  
Before Lincoln, a president had to have congressional 
authorization to perform most actions, including taking private 
property. When President Lincoln took possession of the 
private railroads and telegraphs for military use during the 
Civil War, his actions were constitutional, and they 
subsequently provided the basis for the expansion of executive 
power. President Lincoln’s expansion of the executive power 
also had contemporaneous and subsequent effects on relevant 
case law and executive action.  
I. BOTH THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL LAW AUTHORIZE 
GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
The U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the 
power to declare war on behalf of the country.1 When Congress 
declares war, the President “shall be the Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States…when called into 
the actual Service of the United States.”2 Furthermore, the 
President is charged with the duty of ensuring that Congress’s 
laws are faithfully executed.3  
This constitutional grouping of duties means that the 
federal government contributes to war by allowing the 
President of the U.S. to wage war while Congress merely 
“shirks its constitutional responsibility” and the judiciary has a 
“laissez-faire” approach.4 After Congress has deemed that war 
is necessary, Congress grants the needed appropriations and 
vests power to the President to perform his “Commander-in-
Chief” duties, to neutralize the current threat by winning the 
declared war, and to hand his wartime powers back to 
Congress.  
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. 
4 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 171 (1996). 
51                     6 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2019) 
 
51 
 
This process of transferring war powers between 
branches is supported by the Framer’s conscious fear of a 
concentration of power in one particular branch. The Framers 
were worried that creating and maintaining a standing army 
would lead to concentrated power within the executive branch 
by causing “tyranny at home”. This would be similar to 
European countries keeping standing armies “ under the 
pretext of defending, [but instead, enslaving] the people” by 
allocating the country’s physical power to one branch.5 
Although the topic will be fully discussed later, when 
analyzing a president’s actions, part of the analysis includes 
assessing the Executive Branch’s current scope of power based 
on its evolution.6 Congress gave Presidents “wartime powers” 
discretion in dealing with conflicts until Lincoln’s 
administration. However, Congress closely supervised and 
scrutinized the President’s actions during war or conflict, even 
when Lincoln was acting with regard to statutorily-authorized 
confiscations of private property.7 Hence, the sitting presidents 
who came before Lincoln would rarely act under color of title 
without first obtaining express congressional approval in 
defining the scope in which he may act under the specified 
circumstances.8 
B. LINCOLN’S ACTIONS WERE WELL INSIDE HISTORICAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS. 
1. CONGRESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED PRESIDENT 
LINCOLN TO CONTROL THE RAILROAD AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANIES. 
On January 31, 1862, Congress expressly approved 
President Lincoln’s power to “take possession of the Railroad 
                                                 
5 James Madison, Speech Before Constitutional Convention (June 29, 
1787). 
6 This comment is in regards to the constitutional context up to this 
point in history, not the practical effects. 
7 Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. 110 (1814). 
8 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 957 
(2008). 
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and Telegraph Lines” in the interests of “public safety.”9 In 
doing so, this act authorized the President to take possession of 
and hold any public or private railroads. It also allowed the 
President to take possession of the companies’ stock, personnel 
or real property, for the limited purpose of transportation of 
troops, munitions, equipment, military property, and stores 
anywhere throughout the United States.10  
Furthermore, this Congressional Act authorized the 
President to place any previously-stated personnel under 
military control and make them subject to the rules and articles 
of war.11 The Act  provided for the companies’ punishment if 
they were charged with resisting, interfering, or attempting to 
destroy or injure the property that was subject to the act.  Any 
infractions “shall be” subject to a court-martial and any 
punishment up to and including death.12  
Congress also had the foresight to include within this 
Act, the caveat, that the President shall appoint a commission 
to “assess and determine the damages suffered, or the 
compensation to which any railroad or telegraph company may 
be entitled by reason of the railroad or telegraph line being 
seized.” 13  Then, the amounts would be submitted to Congress 
for payment to the companies or individuals. This procedure of 
appointing a commissioner to compensate the companies or 
individuals satisfies the constitutional requirement that the 
federal government shall not take private property for public 
use without just compensation.14 
After the Act went into effect, the government bought 
its own locomotives and train cars15 at fair market value from 
private individuals, except for those locomotives and cars 
constructed by the Union or captured from the Confederacy.16  
                                                 
9 Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 1, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe 
334 (1861). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at § 2. 
13 Id. at § 3. 
14 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; See, e.g. Omnia Commercial Co. v. U.S., 261 
U.S. 502 (1923).  
15 Hereafter “cars.” 
16 DANIEL C. MCCALLUM , REPORT OF BREVET BRIG. GENERAL D.C. 
MCCALLUM, 1, 10 (1866). 
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In 1861, P.W. & B. Railroad made a net profit increase of 
over $1,000,000, an increase from 1860’s net profit of $236,000. 
In 1863, the same company made net revenues of 
$1,042,266.42.17 Actually, all recorded companies, except the 
B&O Railroad, experienced increased business and profits 
during the war years. The reasons behind this are the war 
closed the Mississippi River’s waterway travel and poor crop 
seasons in Europe increased overall railroad freight demands in 
transporting crops to New York and ultimately to Europe via 
boat.18 Therefore, the war actually helped the railroads 
withdraw from their economic depressions, ensuring that 1863 
became “one of the most prosperous [years] ever known to 
American Railways.”19 Because of this increase in profits, the 
railroad companies appeared to be war profiteering.20 
The northern railroads were not technically “seized” in 
the traditional constitutional meaning, but they were under 
direct supervision of the U.S. Military Railroad’s21 General 
McCallum. Furthermore, only a handful of instances existed 
where the government actually seized a railroad.22  
One such example is when foreign miners in 
Pennsylvania, who were opposed to the draft, forced the 
government to operate the Philadelphia and Reading Railroads 
as to not disrupt coal deliveries for the U.S. Navy.23 More 
specifically, the labor strike’s catalyst was related to a fifty-cent-
per-day raise demand, and the Reading Railroad’s president, 
Mr. Charles E. Smith, sent Assistant Secretary of War and 
former Reading Railroad President to Washington, D.C. to fix 
the effective labor strike.24 The result was that General 
McCallum ordered the reassignment of 142 men from the 
                                                 
17 THOMAS WEBER, THE NORTHERN RAILROADS IN THE CIVIL WAR: 
1861-1865 49-50 (1952).  
18 Id.at 59-62. 
19 Id. at 53 (quoting AMERICAN RAILROAD JOURNAL (1864).). 
20 This article does not delve into the levels of governmental takings 
and actual amounts of compensation to a private party. 
21 Hereafter “U.S.M.R.R.” 
22 Weber, supra note 17. 
23 Id. at 119 (quoting FRANK H. TAYLOR, PHILADELPHIA IN THE CIVIL 
WAR 47 (1913).). This situation is notably similar to the Steel Seizure 
Case. 
24 J.L. BLACKMAN, THE SEIZURE OF THE READING RAILROAD IN 1864 50 
(1987). 
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captured Alexandria Railway to Philadelphia for temporary 
duty.25 However, Mr. Smith actually requested that 
commanding Major General George Cadwalader take 
immediate military possession of the railroad during the crisis, 
to which the Major General agreed26 
 Even during the seizure of railroads near battle areas, 
the War Department was “very careful to give each [railroad] 
the ‘just compensation’ which the Constitution required,” but 
the railroad waived monetary compensation because the 
company benefited financially during the governmental 
seizure.27 After the immediate need for coal (for both the U.S 
Navy and U.S.M.R.R.) ended, the Assistant Quartermaster 
General returned the railroad to the private company.28 The 
War Department was effective in ensuring they committed no 
constitutional violations. There were no other recorded 
complaints or lawsuits in regards to Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause violations.  
During the Civil War, President Lincoln interpreted his 
own wartime power to include the “right to seize citizens’ 
property if such seizure should become indispensable to the 
successful prosecution of the war.”29 During Lincoln’s 
administration, Congress debated whether to build its own 
railroad system or work with private companies for military 
transportation. Congress also considered building its own 
railroad between Washington, D.C. and New York. However, 
after much debate between lobbyists in New York and 
Baltimore with Secretary of War Stanton, Congress scrapped 
the governmental railroad idea. Congress further expressly 
repealed any executive right vested in President Lincoln to 
complete or extend any uncompleted railroad already in 
construction.30  
                                                 
25 Id. at 52. 
26 Id. at 53. 
27 Id. at 55-56. 
28 Id. at 56 (quoting J.J. MOORE, REPORT OF J.J. MOORE, OFFICIAL 
RECORDS, WAR OF THE REBELLION, 67-8.). 
29 JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 6 
(1926). 
30 APPENDIX TO CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 333, 
423 (1861). 
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The result in abandoning any governmental railroad 
was that the government bought the ticket fares for its troops, 
munitions, cavalry, and other items of war directly from the 
private companies. As such, the government entered into 
negotiated contracts with the different railroad companies for 
fares. The railroads charged approximately two cents per mile 
per soldier, allowing each soldier up to 80 pounds of baggage, 
while “equipment, munitions, and troop supplies were to be 
carried at first-class local rates,” the charge varying for weight 
and distance.31  
The North’s Reading Railroad transported the most out 
of any other railroad for a total of 953,397 troops during the 
Civil War, while the Illinois Central moved 556,421 troops 
during the war.32 As previously noted, almost every operating 
railroad at the time saw large profits during the Civil War; 
however, the only railroad claiming losses during the Civil War 
was the Michigan Central Railroad.33 The Michigan Central 
Railroad claimed that the war had dislocated their business, 
and they did not receive enough government patronage to 
make up their losses, but there was never any actual recorded 
“seizure” or governmental “taking” of this railroad to justify 
compensation.34  
In addition to compensating railroad companies for 
transporting military personnel and assets, the government 
compensated the northern railroad companies for the traffic on 
their lines by the government’s own locomotives and cars.35 
After the Union Army confiscated southern railroads, the 
U.S.M.R.R. then repaired the railroads, including bridges, and 
after the war, returned the property to the southern 
companies.36 Of course, this holding of personal property and 
its eventual outcome was dependent upon the Civil War’s 
outcome. 
                                                 
31 Weber, supra note 17, at 151-52. 
32 Id. at 262-63. 
33 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN 
INDIANA RAILROAD, 26 (1864). 
34 Id.  
35 David Pfeiffer, Working Magic with Cornstalks and Beanpoles: Records 
Relating to the U.S. Military Railroads During the Civil War, 43 
PROLOGUE (June 1, 2011), at 32. 
36 Id.  
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 In regards to confiscated Confederate property, case 
law at the time provided that it was “usually held as a mere 
military occupation until the fate of the nation from which it is 
conquered is determined; but if the [Confederacy] is entirely 
subdued, or … be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of 
occupation becomes permanent, and the title [in the 
Confederacy’s private property] vests absolutely in the 
conqueror.”37  
However, the modern rules of engagement and the U.S. 
Military codes required that the U.S. government should not 
destroy or permanently deprive the owners of their railways 
and telegraphs within the South, but instead, the publically-
held property should be restored to its original owners at the 
conclusion of the war.38  
Even though the case law provided that the government 
had a right to keep any confiscated property, the U.S. Military 
chose to vest its ownership interests in its previous Confederate 
owners. Similarly in the North, the railroad companies were 
fully reinvested in their possession and control of their 
property, and the U.S. government compensated the companies 
for the “transportation furnished by them.”39 
Although the analysis has been primarily about 
railroads, President Lincoln also revolutionized wartime 
communications by taking possession of the telegraph 
companies. His taking of the telegraph companies created the 
first military telegraph office in the country, and it was located 
next door to Secretary of War Stanton’s office. These actions 
soon led to the creation of the Military Telegraph Corps 
Bureau.40  
The telegraph companies performed similarly to the 
railroad companies in that they made enormous wartime 
profits. The telegraph companies made approximately 
$2,655,000 (about 41 cents per message) from the government’s 
communications during the Civil War.41 The government also 
negotiated with the telegraph companies for special rates for 
                                                 
37 U.S. v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 434 (1872). 
38 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 809 (1920). 
39 Id. at fn. 39. 
40 Id. at 44. The Military Telegraph Corps bureau will be later 
expanded upon. 
41 DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA: 1832-1920 (2012). 
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messages sent and received, but other times, the government 
paid the regular amount charged to any other party.  
However, the telegraph companies gave the U.S. 
military communications priority over all other telegraph 
communications. This priority status could potentially cause an 
unconstitutional “takings” situation. Furthermore, the 
telegraph companies also received enormous wartime profits 
from 1) the additional commercial traffic as well as from 2) the 
large increase in the amount of telegraph coverage.42 This 
increased commercial traffic included interpersonal 
communications between soldiers and their families, 
newspaper correspondence, and other war-related 
communications. Neither the railroad nor telegraph industries 
were harmed by the U.S. Military or the government’s actions. 
No other violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is 
present from Lincoln’s use of executive power in taking 
possession of the railroad or telegraph companies.  
Finally, the Congressional Act appointed the immediate 
control of the new appropriations of the railroads and telegraph 
companies to be placed under the direct supervision of the 
Secretary of War.43 The Secretary of War at this point in history 
was still included within the President’s cabinet. Therefore, 
ultimate delegation and responsibility was on the President. 
The Act finally concluded that it expressly preempted any other 
regulations, rules, or laws that may be in conflict with the 
“order.”44 
2. PRESIDENT LINCOLN ISSUES EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION. 
Although the preceding section discussed the Act’s 
components, subsequent legal consequences, Fifth Amendment 
implications, and actual possession of the railroad and 
telegraph companies, the analysis is constitutional if President 
Lincoln issued  appropriate executive orders in accordance with 
the Congressional Act.  
                                                 
42 Id.  
43 Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 4, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe 
334, 335 (1861). 
44 Id. 
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On February 25, 1862, Secretary of War Stanton, by 
order of the President, issued an executive order to take 
“military possession of all the telegraph lines in the United 
States.”45 In the same executive order, the telegraph companies 
were expressly prohibited from sending any unauthorized 
information regarding military operations, and the 
government’s possession and control of the telegraph lines was 
not intended to “interfere in any respect with the ordinary 
affairs of the companies or with private business.”46 Later in the 
year, on May 25, 1962, President Lincoln issued another 
executive order allowing him to take “military possession of all 
the railroads” until further orders, directing the companies and 
officers to “hold themselves in readiness for the transportation 
of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the 
military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.”47  
The major difference between these two orders is that 
within the latter order, President Lincoln’s intent was that the 
government’s transportation needs outweigh the needs of any 
private or commercial business the railroads performed. This 
situation is in contrast to the former where the governmental 
use of the telegraph companies’ property was not to interfere 
with “business as usual.” Furthermore, the latter’s order was 
executed by M.C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, on behalf of 
Secretary of War Stanton, which in turn, was on behalf of 
President Lincoln.48 
C. HISTORICALLY, THE EXECUTIVE’S COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF POWER HAD TO BE BASED UPON A SPECIFIC PROVISION 
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OR EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY 
CONGRESS. 
Prior to the Civil War, the President’s use of executive 
power was based upon a specific provision of the U.S. 
                                                 
45 Executive Order—Taking into Military Possession all Telegraph 
Lines in the U.S., The American Presidency Project (Feb. 25, 1862), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69797. 
46 Id.  
47 Executive Order—Taking Military Possession of Railroads, The 
American Presidency Project (May 25, 1862), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69807. 
48 Id.  
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Constitution or expressly authorized by Congress. President 
Lincoln received expressed congressional authorization for 
taking control of the railroad and telegraph companies during 
the Civil War. This section analyzes different presidents’ use of 
the Commander-in-Chief powers from George Washington up 
to Abraham Lincoln’s presidency. 
During George Washington’s presidency, the “most 
prominent war powers questions of the time concerned 
whether Congress had in fact approved specific” war actions.49 
This quotation is an echo of the last section’s constitutional 
analysis, following the dichotomy that if a president’s action is 
not specifically enumerated within the U.S. Constitution, then 
Congress must authorize the current president’s action. The 
original congressional intent did not leave the President free of 
any “statutory encumbrances in exercising his powers in 
command in battle,” which suggests a strict, originalist view of 
Congress’s authority to declare and ultimately supervise the 
President.50 Although this view appears obsolete in the present 
day, it appears to vest ultimate war power authority within the 
two houses of Congress. In history, it seems most successful 
armies have a centralized leader at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy, such as George Washington during the 
Revolutionary War, to vest responsibility of the war’s ultimate 
defeat or victory.51  
While John Adams was the President, Congress 
expressly authorized him to “raise an army of up to 10,000 men 
to serve for three years” and later authorized him to “raise an 
additional 12 infantry regiments and 6 troops of light 
dragoons” in response to the looming French war.52 At that 
time, Congress expressly determined the scope of the war by 
determining the quantity of men and their time commitments 
that would be allowed. In America’s young history, this 
                                                 
49 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 955 
(2008).  
50 Id. 
51 Although this is a mere speculation in regards to historical figures 
such as Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, and Emperor Napoleon 
Bonaparte, the underlying theme is that history usually vests the 
triumphs or defeats with one main actor regardless of the war 
cabinet, armies, and other exigent circumstances. 
52 Id. at 965. 
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allocation of power was a marked increase by allowing the 
President to have direct command over a standing army that 
was only being raised in preparation, not actual current use, for 
a war with France.  
Following the French conflict, President Thomas 
Jefferson recognized that the country should rely on the state 
militia rather than having a standing army. In response, 
Congress reduced half the regular army, down to about 3,300 
standing troops.53 Around this time in 1807, the concept of the 
executive branch’s “temporary necessity” doctrine arose, but 
President Thomas Jefferson’s actions did not “appear to have 
been a constitutional trump.”54 Even during this era, there was 
constant, almost fluid shifting of the executive’s scope of power 
in relation to the legislature. However, many constitutional 
scholars point this war out as being the only constitutional war 
in history.  
President Jefferson appropriated timber for gunboats 
and chemicals for gunpowder. In doing so, he acknowledged 
that he was acting outside his scope of power, but he believed 
that Congress would ultimately approve his actions.55 Not only 
did Congress ratify President Jefferson’s actions, it “stressed 
that disregard of appropriations limitations would be” 
permissible when Congress was not available to address a 
national emergency.56 This is the same argument that President 
Lincoln would later use when defending his actions in 
appropriating funds and raising the Union Army.  
During the War of 1812, a legal case arose where the U.S. 
attorney general in Massachusetts filed to condemn over 500 
tons of lumber within the U.S. that belonged to British 
subjects.57 However, the United States Supreme Court held that 
“the [governmental] seizure [requires] statutory authorization” 
which Congress had not provided, rendering the action covered 
within the legislature’s jurisdiction, rather than the President’s 
                                                 
53 Id. at 973. 
54 Id. at 974. 
55 Id. at 975 (quoting Informal Memorandum from President Thomas 
Jefferson (July 18, 1807) (on file with Online Library of Liberty),  
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jefferson -the-works-vol-1-
autobiography-anas-1760-1770. 
56 Id. 
57 Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. 110, 121 (1814). 
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authority under his Article II wartime powers.58 During the rest 
of the era leading up to the Civil War, the sitting president, at 
any given time, consistently accepted Congress’s war power 
limitations.59 Just as the United States Supreme Court “carves 
out” certain rights or doctrinal principles, the executive 
branch’s remedy to the constant congressional restraint was to 
creatively interpret the statutes to circumvent those limitations, 
such as President Jefferson going through a dichotomy of using 
the government’s “credit” to appropriate naval vessels and not 
actually having approved unauthorized “expenditures.”  
One of the major pre-Civil War issues between the 
legislative and the executive branches was the disagreement 
between President James Buchanan and U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ Captain Meigs. This disagreement between the two 
arose during the building of the Washington, D.C. aqueduct.60 
After Secretary of War John Floyd fired Captain Meigs from the 
aqueduct project over a disagreement, Meigs lobbied Congress 
and received funding and direct supervision over the project.61 
Understandably, President Buchanan found this situation to 
usurp his presidential Commander in Chief powers because 
such a relationship would cause Captain Meigs to fall outside 
of the military hierarchy and no longer answerable to the 
President. Attorney General Jeremiah Black affirmed President 
Buchanan’s view that Congress could not allow Captain Meigs 
to become independent of the President. However, the 
statutory act allowing Meigs appropriations for and control 
over the aqueduct project did not make him independent 
because President Buchanan was still in a position to order him 
as Commander in Chief.62  
At this point prior to the Civil War, the executive 
branch’s powers were fairly concrete with presidents carving 
out exceptions when they were in times of “temporary 
necessity.” The “temporary necessity” doctrine is a prelude to 
the current day’s “ongoing emergency” doctrine. Even before 
President Lincoln, Congress followed two major courses of 
action. First, Congress expressly authorized the scope that the 
                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Barron & Lederman, supra note 8, at 981. 
60 Id. at 984. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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President was allowed to act within. The second course of 
action was to allow the sitting President to appropriate troops 
and property to meet a “temporary necessity” and later ratify 
the President’s actions.  
D. PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S USE OF EXECUTIVE POWERS 
COMPELLED THE CREATION OF ENTIRE BUREAUS TO ASSIST 
IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL, INFRASTRUCTURAL, AND 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR. 
Thus far, the discussion has centered on the 
constitutionality, procedure, and context of the President 
exerting executive powers. This section addresses the 
contemporaneous and subsequent effects of both Congress’s 
and President Lincoln’s actions in regards to the taking of 
personal property during the Civil War. This analysis is specific 
to northern citizens only, and not a dichotomy of the 
constitutionality or aspects of the Emancipation Proclamation.  
President Lincoln’s aggressive use of executive war 
powers compelled the creation of entire bureaus to assist in the 
technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects of the Civil 
War. Congress’s authorizations and President Lincoln’s 
executive orders resulted in Secretary of War Edwin Stanton 
creating two different bureaus to support mass transportation 
of troops and mass communication: the U.S. Military Railroad 
and the U.S. Military Telegraph Service. These bureaus assisted 
in the technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects of the 
Civil War, which ultimately allowed the Union to claim victory. 
Both bureaus and their effects are addressed in turn. 
1. THE PRESIDENT CREATES THE U.S. MILITARY RAILROAD 
BUREAU 
President Lincoln’s administration created the 
U.S.M.R.R. for the purpose of transporting troops, munitions, 
and other necessities of war.63 Even one of President Lincoln’s 
most staunch critics, General George B. McClellan, admitted 
that the introduction of “railroads has introduced a new and 
                                                 
63 Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 15§ 1, 1861 App. to the Congressional Globe 
334 (1861). 
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very important element into the war.”64 The U.S.M.R.R.’s 
lasting effects would later become a precursor for President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s creating the U.S. Army’s 
Transportation Corps.65 The same day that President Lincoln 
issued his railroad executive order, Secretary of War Stanton 
ordered D.C. McCallum’s appointment as military director and 
superintendent of “the railroads in the U.S., with authority to 
enter upon, take possession of, hold and use” all property in 
relation to the President’s purpose of transportation.66  
After these preceding acts, the U.S.M.R.R. bureau 
became existinct, and the government only had one railroad in 
its possession for wartime use, which was a seven-mile-long 
route from Washington, D.C. to Alexandria, Virginia.67 
Brigadier General McCallum was already an experienced 
railroad man who built  railway and railway bridges during the 
war. Regarding the Potomac Bridge, the only available supply 
line between Fredericksburg and Richmond, 51,000 cars 
traversed the bridge throughout the war.68 The U.S.M.R.R. 
acted under the direct orders of both Secretary of War Stanton 
as well as other superior U.S. Army officers.69  
After his appointment to this newly-formed bureau in 
1862, McCallum ordered the purchase of five locomotives and 
eighty cars for military use. The major infrastructural and 
practical problem McCallum faced was that all private 
companies used different gauged tracks in order to compete in 
their respective geographical markets.70 This meant that the 
locomotives used on one railway could not be transferred onto 
another company’s railway because the width and length of the 
track were different between each company.  
Over the entire course of the Civil War, McCallum 
reported a total appropriations amount as follows: he spent $4.9 
million in labor with a total net war expenditure of 
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$29,838,176.7271, he appropriated over 70 locomotives and 1,733 
cars during the war, by purchase, capture, or being built72, and 
he built approximately 137,418 feet of the track,  and he re-laid 
about 185,440 feet.73  
After the war’s end, the government reverted the 
Southern owners’ property back via executive action on August 
8, 1865.74 In regards to the immediate practical and logistical 
impact on the Civil War, the U.S.M.R.R.’s first transportation of 
troops was the transportation of 2,000 troops of the 6th 
Massachusetts regiment, the 1st and 4th Pennsylvania 
regiments, and the Washington Brigade of Philadelphia who 
arrived in 35 cars into Baltimore. After arriving, they had to 
walk a mile to switch railroads onto the B&O Railroad to 
continue the trip to reinforce Washington.75 This expedition 
carried with it the infamous Baltimore rioting attacks, in which 
the troops were attacked while transitioning between rail lines. 
This resulted in four soldiers’ and 12 civilians’ deaths, with 36  
civilian injuries.76 Also, the U.S.M.R.R.’s largest reported 
transportation was with the 4th Army Corps from Carter’s 
Station, TN to Nashville, TN, totaling 33 miles with 1,498 cars.77 
The most strategic use of the U.S.M.R.R. was Lincoln’s 
authorization of a plan to reinforce General William Rosecrans 
after being defeated in the battle of Chickamauga (Sept. of 1863) 
and while there was a siege in Chattanooga, TN (as of Nov. of 
1963).78  
Because of Secretary Stanton’s and the U.S.M.R.R.’s 
actions, the War Department transported Major General Joseph 
Hooker and about 20,000 men and 3,000 horses and mules from 
Virginia to eastern Tennessee, traveling 1,159 miles in seven to 
nine days, preventing the Confederate Army from taking 
Tennessee.79 This bureau’s achievements resulted in scientific 
innovations, thereby assisting the Lincoln administration’s war 
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prosecution. The use of the U.S.M.R.R. achieved a mass 
transportation and supply chain that would transport many 
troops and allowed them to be deployed in a distant location 
where they were needed to supply existing troops, refresh more 
troops, or remove wounded troops.80  
Another contribution was the increased development in 
efficient construction and destruction of both tracks and 
bridges. These new construction techniques were completed 
accurately and efficiently by using “ready-made bridges and 
trestles constructed on an assembly-like technique.”81 The final 
and most interesting practical aspect of the U.S.M.R.R.’s war 
contributions was its humanitarian impact.  
The government developed special equipment, 
including hospital cars that assisted in decreasing gangrene 
rates among the wounded; hospital trains quickly evacuated 
and treated the wounded; and armored cars with on-car 
munitions or artillery readily assisted in the battlefield.82 
2. THE PRESIDENT CREATES THE TELEGRAPH SERVICE 
BUREAU. 
After Secretary of War Stanton released the February 25, 
1862 executive order that took military possession of all 
telegraph lines, President Lincoln’s administration created the 
U.S. Military Telegraph Service83.The executive order 
authorized the “possession of, prevention of certain print or 
letting news out, and it was not intended to interfere with 
ordinary affairs of the companies or private businesses.”84  
Before 1861, the Signal Corps was small and more 
concentrated on large flag signals between ships on the sea or 
regiments on the battlefield.85 Assistant Secretary of War 
Thomas A. Scott became the general manager of all telegraph 
                                                 
80 Weber, supra note 75, at 264-67. 
81 Id. at 267. 
82 Id. at 268. 
83 Hereafter “U.S.M.T.S.” 
84 Executive Order—Taking into Military Possession all Telegraph 
Lines in the U.S., The American                                                
Presidency Project (Feb. 25, 1862), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69797. 
85 JOSEPH W. BROWN, THE SIGNAL CORPS, U.S.A. IN THE WAR OF THE 
REBELLION 140 (1896). 
PRESIDENT LINCOLN  66 
 
lines so he could create the War Department’s telegraph office, 
headed by Major Albert James Myer.86 The telegraph bureau 
was created separate from the transportation corps and partly 
separate from the Signal Corps because the government’s needs 
required a completely different skill set and type of resources 
than ever before.87  Telegraph workers were not considered 
military personnel; however, unlike the railroad workers, they 
were so skilled that they were “indispensable in their jobs” and 
were not subject to the draft.88 Even though the U.S.M.T.S. 
bureau was born and used in military operations, those men 
who served in this bureau were not given military status. The 
reason for which was to prevent them from being under 
generals’ and other military officers’ control, rather than 
immediately answerable to President Lincoln and Secretary of 
War Stanton.89 Because of the bureau’s lack of skilled 
“linesmen,” Congress finally passed a law that allowed military 
men to join the Signal Corps and more specifically, the 
U.S.M.T.S., while retaining their current military ranks and 
pay.90 
By 1863, the total amount of men in the U.S.M.T.S. was 
1,012 strong, but by the end of the war, it increased to 
approximately 2,500 men strong.91 At the beginning of the war, 
approximately $10,000 was appropriated to the Signal Corps for 
the construction expenditures of telegraph infrastructure.92 
The U.S.M.T.S. worked with the U.S.M.R. by inventing 
telegraph trains that were allowed to be near the occurring 
battles, so generals could efficiently coordinate troop 
movements and live battle reports could be sent to Washington, 
D.C.93 The telegraph operations not only kept President 
Lincoln supplied with a constant update on battle situations, 
but this bureau assisted Union generals in concerting their 
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attacks over long distance and in mass transit of soldiers.94 The 
Confederate Army also attempted to wiretap the telegraph lines 
but could not cipher the important encrypted messages to 
Washington, D.C. In the same way, the Union would also 
disseminate misleading military information to the 
Confederate eavesdroppers of the U.S.M.T.S.95 This was 
similar to the British during the Revolutionary War.  
By the end of the Civil War, the U.S.M.T.S. had spent a 
total appropriations allotment of about $16.9 million, including 
total pay, clothing, transportation, forage, arms, and signal 
apparatuses and stores.96 In total, the U.S.M.T.S. laid over 
15,000 miles of telegraph line and had sent over 6.5 million 
messages. While the telegraph companies gave the military use 
priority in communications, the companies still made large 
wartime profits.97 The creation of both the U.S.M.R.R. and 
U.S.M.T.S. clearly had positive impacts on the war’s 
technological, infrastructural, and practical aspects. 
E. PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S EXPANSION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH HAD LEGAL IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTS 
AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS’ CASE LAW IN 
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER. 
As with any war, litigation arose in relation to Fifth 
Amendment Takings. Also, the President’s use of executive 
power broadened the scope of the executive branch’s position. 
President Lincoln’s taking military possession of the rail and 
telegraph companies’ property under the doctrine of temporary 
necessity affected all three branches of government. This was 
done by evolving governmental takings’ case law and 
ultimately defining the scope of executive power. First, this 
section addresses the subsequent effects on case law in regards 
to the Civil War. Second, this section will address the 
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chronology of effects on future presidents, including Theodore 
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Harry Truman in relation to 
the same subject matter. Finally, this section will address Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence from the Steel Seizure Case becoming the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion.  
In U.S. v. Pacific Railroad, the Union Army destroyed 
thirteen railroad bridges surrounding St. Louis, Missouri when 
the Confederate Army, led by Sterling Price in October of 1864, 
was closing in to capture the city.98 The U.S. government rebuilt 
four of the 13 destroyed bridges after the incident for military 
necessity; however, they charged the Pacific Railroad the total 
amount of $181,548.89 for the rebuilding.99 The government 
ultimately sued the company when it refused to pay.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the U.S. is not responsible for “the 
destruction of private property by its military operation during 
the [Civil War], nor are private parties chargeable for works 
constructed on their property by the U.S. to facilitate such 
operations [of war]” without the request of, or contract with the 
railroad.100 This holding has two outcomes.  
First, the government spent its resources rebuilding 
private property; however, the government used rebuilt 
property for its own necessity and use. Therefore, the owner 
should not bear the financial burden. The Supreme Court’s 
second holding is that private property destroyed during 
wartime does not require the government to carry the liability 
for compensating the owner. This is an important difference in 
theory and thought in relation to the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings’ Clause.  
Two ways of analyzing the Supreme Court’s rationale 
exist. First, although the government took the private property 
for its use without compensation, there was no property since 
the bridge was destroyed. The government used its own 
resources to rebuild and use the bridge. This situation would 
result in the railroad company not having to pay for the new 
bridge because it was not a party to any transaction until after 
the military was finished using the newly-constructed bridge. 
The second way of analyzing the constitutional implication is 
that although the government destroyed the bridges so that 
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they would not fall into Confederate enemy hands, it did not 
bear the loss of the property because the military was merely 
destroying the enemy’s future property.101  However, the 
owners were compensated in the way that the government 
rebuilt the bridges for them, ultimately at no charge to the 
owners because of the Supreme Court’s holding. 
Along with this previous case, The Prize Cases assisted in 
creating the doctrine of “enemy property.”102 This doctrine 
states that a private party cannot bring a takings claim if one’s 
property is enemy property or will inevitably fall into enemy 
hands, and if it is destroyed during wartime, the result is that 
no one is liable for its loss because of the circumstances.103 The 
courts later stated that as to the justiciability of the “enemy 
property doctrine,” federal courts have no role in supervising 
presidential designations of such in regards to war powers.104  
The Prize Cases are relevant, but not specifically to this 
subject matter because they address executive power in the 
context of the power to declare wars, order blockades, and seize 
enemy property.105 Later and in World War Two, oil companies 
with property in Manila brought suit against the U.S. 
government for destroying terminal facilities while engaging 
the Empire of Japan.106 The Supreme Court held that destroying 
property for the purpose of preventing strategically-valued 
property from falling into enemy hands was considered 
“waging war” and did not violate the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.107  
The Supreme Court did not expressly restate the 
existence of the “enemy property” doctrine, but it did state that 
the U.S. makes no promise to compensate “all who suffer from 
every ravage and burden of war,… and in wartime[,] many 
losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war and not 
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to the sovereign, and no rigid rules will be laid down to 
distinguish compensable losses from non-compensable losses, 
but each case will be judged on its own facts.”108 Therefore, on 
a case-by-case analysis, the court should decide which 
government is at fault and apply the enemy property doctrine. 
This is still good law.  
In regards to the Executive Branch, the old adage that 
“power corrupts” is accurate. In any Introduction to 
Constitutional Law course, the professor will almost always 
orate Lord Acton’s quote that “power corrupts and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely” in regards to the executive branch. 
Although President Lincoln has been accused of serious 
constitutional violations, he is not the only president who has 
attempted to unilaterally assert unconstitutional powers. For 
instance, during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, he wielded 
unauthorized executive power on the basis of “public policy” 
by building the Panama Canal.109  
President Theodore Roosevelt often claimed rights to 
action via his Commander in Chief powers.  These powers were 
becoming more recognized and accepted by legal scholars as 
there was now an omnipresent army and navy.110 The “Great 
White Fleet” naval tour occurred during his presidency, and he 
later released a controversial executive order restricting the 
Marine Corps to on-shore bases only, causing intense friction 
between the Legislative and Executive Branches.111 President 
Roosevelt finally acquiesced to Congress’s limitation, thwarting 
a “battle of the branches” scenario. Later, President Woodrow 
Wilson unilaterally set a fixed price for procuring the navy’s 
coal throughout the Navy Department from private parties, and 
the Supreme Court found that the “owner of coal taken by the 
government under [the Lever Act], was entitled to the full 
money equivalent of the property taken, and to be put in as 
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good position pecuniarily as it would have occupied, had its 
property had not been taken.”112  
A few decades later, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer proved to be one of the most influential and still current 
examples of the Executive’s power in regards to governmental 
Takings Clause.113 Although the facts have been scattered 
across many other cases and law reviews, they will be briefly 
described here. President Truman directed the seizure and 
operation of the nation’s steel mills in response to labor union 
disputes under the rationale that his actions were necessary to 
“avert a national catastrophe” in the Korean War.114 The 
Supreme Court found that the President’s preventing labor 
disputes was under Congress’s jurisdiction and not within the 
President’s jurisdiction. The President could not use military 
authorities through executive action to “expand the theater of 
war” powers as Commander-in-Chief, seizing the steel plants 
by military force.115 The President’s use of military force could 
not be “sustained as [an] exercise of [the] President’s military 
power” and was unconstitutional.116  
The outcome may have been very different had the 
Korean War been ongoing instead of concluded. However, 
more interesting and resounding was Justice Jackson’s 
classification concurrence that describes the President’s powers 
as not being “fixed but [fluctuating], depending upon their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”117 In his 
concurrence, Justice Jackson proposed an “over-simplified 
grouping” of the tests to determine the strength of the 
President’s powers. Within the first classification, the President 
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress,” and his power is at its height because he “possesses 
in his own right plus all that Congress [has delegated].”118 
Justice Jackson further added that a “seizure [of property] 
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress 
                                                 
112 U.S. v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923) (quoting 
Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 299 (1923)). 
113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
114 Id. at 582. 
115 Id. at 587. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 635. 
118 Id. 
PRESIDENT LINCOLN  72 
 
would be supported by the strongest presumptions and widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation,” causing almost limitless 
executive power.119 This first classification is commonly 
referred to as the President’s “high-watermark of power.”  
This is also the classification to which President 
Lincoln’s taking possession of the railroad and telegraph 
companies’ property lies. Within the second classification, 
Congress has remained neutral in neither granting nor denying 
the President authority, but in this classification, the President 
may “rely upon his own independent powers” during this 
“twilight” of power where either he or Congress may possess 
the power to act, but he nonetheless acts first and his actions 
may be later condemned or allowed by Congress.120 As 
previously discussed, President Thomas Jefferson’s actions 
with procuring boats for war would fall into this category.121  
The third and final classification is the lowest ebb of the 
executive power for the President. When he wields his power 
in a way that is “incompatible with the [express] or implied will 
of Congress,” he can only act upon matters that remain after 
Congress has acted.122 In theory, this explanation of power 
would best be illustrated by the seminal case of Marbury v. 
Madison where the Supreme Court states that the Court may 
exercise judicial review over the executive branch.123 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence later became the Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981).124 In 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis began and 
President Jimmy Carter acted pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and seized all 
Iranian assets.125 After an agreement ending all litigation 
between Iran and the U.S., the plaintiff challenged the 
Executive Branch’s powers in making the agreement, claiming 
the agreement was unconstitutional.126 The Supreme Court’s 
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majority opinion entered into Justice Jackson’s previous 
concurrence.127 The Court restated the three classifications of 
Executive’s power, even though the taxonomy would never be 
completely “black and white.”128 The Court found that 
President Carter’s actions fell within the first classification and 
they were “taken pursuant to specific congressional 
authorization [and were] supported by the strongest 
presumptions and widest latitude of judicial determination.” 
President Carter acted just as President Lincoln did, through 
Congress’s express authorization. 
F. THE CURRENT STATE OF TEMPORARY NECESSITY HAS 
TRANSFORMED INTO “NATIONAL EMERGENCY.” 
As a final point, relevant but not separate from the 
article’s dialogue, is the modern executive branch’s use of 
declaring a “national emergency” to justify its actions that may 
violate the U.S. Constitution. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
presidency, there has been almost a constant state of “national 
emergency” that has been renewed by other presidents, 
including President Truman in 1950, President Nixon in 1970, 
and even Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.129 
This “national emergency” is an echo of previous presidents’ 
“temporary necessity” argument. However, Congress has 
allowed the current day’s “national emergency” expansion of 
power by codifying it in the U.S. Code through the National 
Emergency Act and International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act.130 These executive proclamations give force to about 470 
different provisions of Federal law.131  
Some of these powers include seizing property, 
organizing and controlling the means of production, seizing 
commodities, assigning military forces abroad, instituting 
martial law, seizing and controlling all transportation and 
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communication, regulating the operation of private enterprise, 
restricting travel, and ultimately controlling the particularity of 
American citizens’ lives.132 Even in the 1970s, members of 
Congress recognized the executive branch’s encroachment 
upon the U.S. Constitution. Congressman Beck noted that the 
President’s range of powers did and still allows him or 
Congress to proclaim a national emergency.133  
This state of constitutional affairs is the same as with 
President Lincoln. He was able to seize property, suspend 
habeas corpus, and control the press; however, in regards to the 
railroads and telegraph companies, his military possession was 
both necessary and constitutional. The continued tolerance of 
allowing the executive branch to usurp its constitutional 
bounds is the result of congressional inaction and judicial 
tolerance that must be remedied.134 In Lincoln’s national 
emergency of Civil War and even now during the ongoing war 
on terror, “adherence to constitutional principles is even more 
warranted during such times ‘so that we may resist the 
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient 
solution to the crisis of the day.’”135 
CONCLUSION 
President Lincoln was a man faced with a presidency of 
epic proportions. His country was on the brink of Civil War, 
and he was required to act quickly in hopes of the Union’s 
preservation. Congress expressly and constitutionally 
authorized his taking military possession of the railroad and 
telegraph companies’ property. President Lincoln acted within 
the historical contextual scope of his powers in regards to this 
situation. His use of his authorized executive powers created 
the U.S.M.R.R., a precursor to the U.S. Army’s Transportation 
Corps and the U.S.M.T.S., a division of the Signal Corps. He 
utilized these bureaus both assisted in bringing an end to the 
U.S. Civil War as well as progressing war’s use of mass 
transportation and communication. Ultimately, his actions, as 
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well as the results of the Civil War, impacted case law and 
future presidents’ use of the executive power to the point that 
now, perhaps the time has come for the legislative and judicial 
branches to reign in the executive branch’s powers to bring the 
balance and separation of powers back into the constitutional 
realm. 
